Using nine years of personnel records from a regional grocery store chain in the United States, this study examines the effect of manager ethnicity on the ethnic composition of employment at the firm's 73 stores.
As both American managers and their employees grow more ethnically diverse, it is increasingly important to understand whether manager ethnicity affects the ethnic composition of an establishment's workforce. For example, in the most comprehensive study of workplace segregation in the United States, Hellerstein and Neumark (2007) find a substantial degree of ethnic segregation across U.S. workplaces.
Further, they find that while this segregation results partly from residential segregation and from segregation by ethnically correlated skills, other mechanisms are likely to be important.
One possibility is that ethnic segregation of employees is directly linked to ethnic differences between managers. Several factors could lead managers to hire and retain more employees who share their ethnic background. In particular, these factors include discrimination by managers or employees, production complementarities due to shared language or culture, and ethnically segregated labor market networks.
Using nine years of personnel records from a regional grocery store chain in the United States, this study examines the role of manager ethnicity on the ethnic composition of employment at the firm's 73 stores. We look at the effects of ethnic dissimilarity on new hires, separations, and transfers between stores. And we compare the effects of dissimilarity across several departments and job titles at each store.
The workforce we study is primarily white, but has a large Hispanic minority and very few members of other race or ethnic groups. Hence, our focus is on the role of Hispanic ethnicity.
To be sure, we analyze data from only a single employer, and our study faces the usual limitation of such case studies in that we cannot know how well our results may generalize to other firms and other industries. However, the detail provided by personnel data is crucial to studying the question at hand. If one uses large representative data sets, it is not possible to match managers with their employees and to observe the flow of employment in and out of workplaces over time.
This data set also has several other valuable features. First, our data has large numbers of Hispanics not only among employees, but also in managerial positions. Despite the growing importance of Hispanics in the U.S. labor force, there has been relatively little work on ethnicity in the U.S. labor market. The Hispanic presence in our data set allows us to focus on this understudied group.
Second, because we have several years of data on each store and because there are several departments within each store, we observe multiple managers at each of the firm's workplaces.
Moreover, there is substantial within-store variation in manager ethnicity both over time and across departments. This is important because manager ethnicity may be correlated with several characteristics of a workplace that affect the ethnicity of a new hire (e.g., skill requirements and the demographics of the local labor pool), and such workplace characteristics are typically unobserved. By examining variation in manager ethnicity that occurs within stores, we can control for all such unobserved differences across workplaces.
Third, because each store has several departments and job titles, we are able to compare the effects of ethnic dissimilarity for six different positions within the store-courtesy clerks, cashiers, stockers, meat wrappers, meat cutters, and produce clerks. Finally, we are able to separately analyze employment flows into and out of the store, and to distinguish changes in firm employment (new hires and separations) from changes in store employment due to transfers between stores. By comparing the effects of manager ethnicity and ethnic differences for different job types and different employment outcomes, we gain some insights into both the underlying reasons for the relationships that we find and the applicability of the results to other jobs and sectors.
We find significant differences in the hiring patterns of Hispanic and white, non-Hispanic managers in the four job positions that are in small departments, but not in the two positions in larger departments. Further, we find that manager ethnicity has no significant effects on transfers, and affects rates of employee separations in only one case.
First, our results indicate that Hispanic managers hire more Hispanics than non-Hispanic white managers when hiring for the four positions that are in small departments: bagger, meat wrapper, meat cutter, and produce clerk. These positions differ from the two that are not affected-cashiers and stockers-in that their numbers are much smaller; there are typically between one and three employees in each of the former positions vs. six to eight in the latter. We examine below why ethnicity may affect hiring patterns at our firm; our analysis points away from production complementarities and employee discrimination, and toward hiring networks and managerial discrimination. We also discuss why ethnic differences affect hiring patterns in only the small departments.
Second, in no case does manager ethnicity affect the probability that an employee transferring from another store is Hispanic. Finally, ethnic differences between managers and employees have significant effects on rates of employee separations in only one case: cashiers. We discuss below what may distinguish cashiers from the other positions. Hellerstein and Neumark (2007) , looking at the percentages of employees in an individual's establishment who are white, black and Hispanic, document extensive segregation of U.S. workplaces by race and by Hispanic ethnicity. Their database, which matches records in the 1990 Decennial Census of Population to a Census Bureau list of most U.S. business establishments, makes their study the most comprehensive study to date of workplace segregation. Still, their data lacks detailed information on individuals and establishments, and does not match employees to their managers. Hence their ability to determine the sources of segregation is limited, and they cannot examine the link between manager race or ethnicity and the racial and ethnic composition of employees.
Background
Using a variety of data sets that match employees with their managers, a handful of valuable studies that focus mostly on blacks have looked at the question of whether segregation of employees is directly linked to differences between managers. Stoll, Raphael and Holzer (2004) , Carrington and Troske (1998), Turner (1997) , and Bates (1994) all find that blacks are employed at greater rates in establishments with black supervisors, managers, or owners. However, these studies are unable to control for unobserved differences across workplaces that may be correlated with manager race (e.g., skill requirements and the demographics of the local labor pool). Hence they are limited in their ability to conclude that differences in race or ethnicity between managers and their employees are an important source of segregation.
More recently, using a panel data set constructed from the personnel records of a large retail chain, a study of how manager race and ethnicity affects hiring patterns by has been able to control for unobserved workplace characteristics by examining changes in management within stores. Further, in addition to blacks and whites, this study also examines the hiring patterns of Hispanic managers. The authors find that even within the same stores, hiring patterns vary significantly across managers of different racial and ethnic groups. The largest differences are between black and non-black managers, but in locations with large Hispanic populations, Hispanic managers hire significantly more Hispanics and fewer whites than do white managers.
In a separate paper using the same data set, examine the effects of racial and ethnic differences between manager and employee on rates of employee turnover and promotions.
They find that when the manager is a different race or ethnicity, both black and Hispanic employees are more likely to be fired and less likely to be promoted. They also find small effects of ethnic differences on the quit rates of Hispanics and of whites. Overall, the findings of these two papers by Giuliano et al. suggest that both manager preferences for similar employees and employee preferences for similar managers play a role in determining the racial and ethnic composition of employees.
Apart from these two studies, we know of no other study that examines ethnic differences between managers and their employees. Other papers have studied the importance of racial and ethnic dissimilarity in other contexts. Antonovics and Knight (2004) find that racial or ethnic similarity of police officer to driver reduces vehicle search rates; and Dee (2005) finds that racial or ethnic dissimilarity between students and teachers significantly causes teacher evaluation of students to be more negative. However, while both of these studies includes Hispanics, they both group Hispanics together with blacks; hence neither estimates separate effects of ethnic dissimilarity for Hispanics.
Finally, Hispanics have been the focus of a few experimental studies of hiring discrimination.
For example, Kenney and Wissoker (1994) analyze data from an audit study in which pairs of Hispanic and Anglo auditors with similar skills apply for the same low-skill, entry-level positions with advertised vacancies. They find that Hispanic auditors were less likely than their Anglo counterparts both to obtain job interviews and to be offered jobs. However, presumably because of insufficient variation, they do not look at the role of employer or interviewer ethnicity.
Data
The data we analyze are the administrative personnel records from a large regional grocery store chain in the United States. The records cover a nine-year period from 1976 to 1984, and they contain information on every retail employee employed at each of the firm's stores as of December 31 st of each year.
Each year in the sample period, the firm operated between 57-61 retail stores located in 24 cities, and roughly 60 percent of the stores were concentrated in a single major metropolitan area. The firm closed several stores and opened several others during this period. As a result, our sample includes data on a total of 73 stores, with an average of 7.3 years of data per store, forming a panel of 532 store-years. Table 1 summarizes the salient characteristics of the stores in our sample. A typical store had about 29 retail employees. The average workforce was predominantly white and non-Hispanic (82 percent), but had a sizeable minority of Hispanics (15 percent). The remaining 3 percent were classified as black, Asian, or Native American, and are grouped together here under the category called "nonwhite". The share of Hispanics in each store's workforce was reflective of the population demographics where the store was located; the average Hispanic share across the 24 cities in our sample was 14.1 percent.
With the exception of three salaried managerial positions, all were covered by collective bargaining agreements. 1 The union agreements addressed pay levels, work scheduling, holidays, vacations and other benefits. However, importantly for our analysis, the employer retained full control over hiring and job allocation. When filling a vacancy, the employer was free to fill the position with a newly hired employee and was contractually obligated only to inform the union who was hired in a timely manner. In the case where the firm decided to fill a vacancy through internal promotion, the union contract required only that the most senior employee in the relevant source job be considered for the job.
Thus the unions did not play a significant role in hiring, job assignment, or the assignment of managers at this company.
Figure 1 presents a simple organization chart for the firm. 2 Each store had three salaried positions-the store manager, the assistant manager, and the relief manager. In addition, there were three other managerial positions-the night crew chief, who supervised stocking of the store during the night, and the meat and produce managers, who supervised their respective departments.
The employees we study worked in one of four departments: front-end, stocking, meat, and produce. Employees with the job title of "food clerk" worked either in the front-end operating the cash registers (henceforth "cashiers") or in the stocking department stocking shelves (henceforth "stockers").
These two positions made up the bulk of employees, with a typical store averaging 8 cashiers and 6.4 stockers ( Table 1) . Courtesy clerks, who bagged and carried groceries for customers (henceforth "baggers"), were also in the front-end department. Each store employed 3.2 baggers on average. The meat department had two non-managerial positions: meat cutters (roughly two per store) and meat wrappers (roughly one per store); and the produce department had produce clerks (an average of 1.6 per store) who stocked the produce.
In addition to these four departments, most stores also had a variety (non-foods) department that typically had only one employee and no manager, and a few stores had other specialized departments such as a bakery. Our analysis excludes employees in these departments due to the small sample sizes.
Our analysis requires matching each employee with his or her managers each year. The manager we are most interested in is the one who supervised the employee directly. For front-end employees (baggers and cashiers), the store manager is considered the direct supervisor. Stockers are assigned to the night crew manager, and employees in the produce and meat departments are assigned to their respective department managers. 3 We also match every employee to each of the salaried managers in the store. When matching employees in one year to the manager in the following year, we must take into consideration the fact that one of this year's employees may be next year's manager. To avoid 3 In the case of stockers, our matching is imperfect because we do not have data on shifts and thus do not know whether there are some stockers who do not work the night shift. We have experimented with assigning stockers to the relief manager instead and in general, doing so does not lead to different conclusions. 4 About 10 percent of store-years are missing one of the three salaried managers, but very few are missing more than one. Assistant and relief managers are missing with about the same frequency as are store managers. Also, roughly seven percent of meat and produce managers are missing. The frequency with which these managers are missing is not correlated with store employment and the manager vacancies are temporary. The case of night crew chiefs is different. About 30 percent of store-years are missing a night crew chief, and many of these are consecutive years in the same store. The frequency with which stores lack night crew chiefs is highly correlated with store employment, suggesting that smaller stores often do not employ one. 5 Roughly 15 percent of store-years remain without a night crew chief. In these cases, we have experimented with assigning the relief manager as the stockers' manager. In general, our conclusions do not change.
designating an employee as his or her own manager, we exclude from our estimation sample employees who were promoted to manager within their own department. and all had the same union pay scale, which encompassed several different pay rates based on seniority.
Employee characteristics
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As expected, average tenure is highly correlated with wage rates, and is lowest among baggers whose average tenure is less than one year. Table 3 summarizes the characteristics of our managers. The degree of ethnic diversity differs considerably across the managerial positions. Only 2.5 percent of store managers are Hispanic, but the Hispanic share increases to 6.5 for assistant managers, 10.7 percent for relief managers, and 17.7 for night crew chiefs. And, as is true of non-managerial employees, the Hispanic share of managers is highest in the meat and produce departments, with produce managers having the largest share (29.6 percent). Only about one percent of all managers are classified as non-white (black, Asian, or Native American).
Manager characteristics
It is also notable that there are very few female managers at any level. Indeed, during the latter part of the sample period, the employer faced a class action lawsuit over gender differences in promotion and pay.
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Store-level managers-store manager, assistant manager, and relief manager -typically earned substantially more than other employees. The one exception is that the average earnings of the meat department manager were greater than those of the assistant or relief managers. Night crew chiefs and produce managers earned less than relief managers, but earned a wage premium of about 13 percent over food and produce clerks.
While managers typically have between six and sixteen years of tenure, there is considerable turnover within each position due to a combination of separations, promotions, and transfers of managers between stores. The probability that a manager is replaced in a given year is about 31.5 percent for store managers and night crew chiefs, 40 percent for assistant and relief managers, and 26.6 percent for meat and produce managers. In nearly all cases, the managerial vacancies are filled through promotions or transfers; only two percent of those in our sample were filled through new hires.
The churning of managers is important for our analysis because it provides one source of variation in manager ethnicity within stores. Within the time frame of our data, 90 percent of the stores have at least one change in the identity of the highest-ranked salaried manager (store manager., or assistant manager if the store manager is missing); and 10 percent of stores have some time-series variation in the ethnic classification of this manager. There is more time-series variation in the ethnicity of the relief managers, night crew chiefs, and the meat and produce managers. For each managerial position, more than a quarter of all stores have both a Hispanic and a white, non-Hispanic filling the position during our sample period.
Our analysis also exploits a second source of variation in manager ethnicity: that which is due to ethnic differences between department managers in the same store and year. There is substantial variation here, especially among night crew chiefs, meat managers and produce managers. In 40 percent of our store-year observations, there is some ethnic variation among the night crew, meat, and produce managers; and in 30 percent, the produce manager's ethnicity differs from that of the meat manager.
7 Ransom & Oaxaca (2005) examine the lawsuit's impact on gender differences in promotions and pay.
Measures of Ethnic Dissimilarity
To measure the ethnic relationship between an employee and his or her managers, we construct a dummy variable that is equal to one if the employee's manager is a different ethnicity. This variable is summarized in the second panel in Table 2 . On average, approximately 18 percent of all baggers and cashiers work in a store where their supervisor (i.e. the highest-ranking salaried manager) is a different ethnicity. Because most store managers are white, this group is composed mainly of Hispanic employees with white managers.
Among employees with department managers or supervisors, the fraction with dissimilar managers is much higher, and it is also more evenly split between whites and Hispanics. Among stockers, 22 percent have a dissimilar night crew chief; and roughly 33 percent of meat and produce employees have a dissimilar department manager. Breaking these statistics down by employee ethnicity, we see that among this group there are at least as many whites with Hispanic managers as there are
Hispanics with white managers.
Though many employees have dissimilar managers, there is nevertheless a tendency for managers and their employees to be of the same ethnicity. This can be seen in Table 4 , which compares the ethnic composition of employees under white (non-Hispanic) and Hispanic managers. On average, the proportion of employees that is Hispanic is 13.5 percent among those with white, non-Hispanic managers, but is nearly three times as high (39.2 percent) among those with Hispanic managers. The difference in demographics between the employees of white managers and those of Hispanic managers is especially high among baggers.
This correlation between manager and employee ethnicity could result from the residential segregation of whites and Hispanics. However, this pattern could also result if (1) Hispanic managers tend to hire more Hispanic employees than do white managers, or (2) employees whose ethnicity is different from the ethnicity of their managers have higher separation rates than employees who are ethnically similar to their managers. We examine the latter two hypotheses in our regression analysis below.
Measures of Employment Flows
The bottom panel of Table 2 describes the flow of employment in and out of each job title. There are three basic ways employees can enter a job: hires, transfers from the same position at another store, and promotions. There are also three basic ways one can exit: separations from the company, transfers to the same job at another store, and promotions (which may involve transfers between departments or stores).
The main focus of our analysis is on employment flows in and out of the firm, and hence we are interested in new hires and separations. The probability that a given employee was hired within the past year is largest among baggers at about 68 percent. For all other positions, it is between seven and ten percent. Our sample contains a total of more than 2000 new hires into the six job titles we examine. The probability that an individual's employment with the company is terminated within a year is again highest for baggers at 45 percent, and ranges from 10 to 17 percent for employees in the other positions. 8 Our data set documents roughly 1700 separations from job titles we examine.
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There is very little movement between departments-except for baggers moving to stocking and produce when promoted, and the movement of produce clerks into the stocker position (about 10 percent per year). However, with the exception of baggers, transfers between stores within same job title were common. The probability that a (non-bagger) employee is found in the same job but a different store one year later ranges from nine percent for produce clerks to 20 percent for meat cutters.
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With regard to movement through promotions (in-store and transfer promotions), each year 26 percent of baggers are promoted to stocker, cashier, or produce clerks; 7.5 percent of stockers are promoted to night crew chief or relief manager; 2.3 percent of meat employees are promoted to meat cutter; and roughly 5 percent of meat cutters and produce clerks are promoted to the managerial position 8 Because we don't observe employees who were hired after Jan. 1 st and separated before Dec. 31 st of a given year, estimates based on our sample are likely to underestimate true turnover rates. The sample selection bias in our estimates of turnover rates is likely to matter most for baggers. We discuss this issue further below. 9 Separations are inferred from the fact that the employee was not present in the following year. For stores that closed, we exclude employees in the year before closing. We also exclude observations from the last year of our sample period (Dec. 31, 1984) . 10 Employees in stores that close are excluded from this measure.
in their respective departments.
Manager Ethnicity and Hiring Patterns
In estimating the effect that manager ethnicity has on the ethnic composition of new hires, a key challenge is that the characteristics of both managers and employees may be correlated with other characteristics of a workplace and its location. For our data set, where job descriptions and skill requirements are highly uniform across workplaces, the main concern is variation in the ethnic composition of the labor pool due to the residential segregation of ethnic groups. Stores located in Hispanic neighborhoods might tend to have more Hispanic managers and hire more Hispanic employees simply because both managers and employees have a preference for working close to where they live.
Hence without detailed information on the ethnic composition on the labor pool, the role of manager ethnicity cannot be identified by making comparisons across stores.
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Our identification strategy is to exploit variation in manager ethnicity that occurs within stores.
As discussed above, there are two sources of such variation in our data. The first is time-series variation that arises due to manager turnover-such as when a Hispanic manager replaces a white manager or vice versa. The second source of within-store variation is the ethnic differences between contemporaneous managers of different departments in the same store.
We start by using the time-series variation to estimate a model with store fixed effects. Our basic estimation equation is a linear probability model in which the dependent variable is a dummy variable that is equal to one if an employee i, hired in store j at time t, is Hispanic:
Here, the parameter of interest is the coefficient β on a dummy variable (Mgr_Hispanic) that equals one if the manager of the department making the new hire is Hispanic. 12 The store fixed effects, μ j , summarize the effects of any permanent differences across stores, communities, and local labor markets on the probability that a new hire is Hispanic. The equation also includes a set of dummy variables, T t , corresponding to eight of the nine years in our sample. These year identifiers control for changes over time in labor supply and demand that might affect the ethnic composition of the labor pools for all stores.
Finally, X jt represents a vector of covariates that vary within stores over time.
We estimate several versions of equation (1). In each case, we estimate the equation separately for baggers, cashiers, and stockers, but we pool employees in the meat and produce departments in order to increase our sample size and boost the precision of our estimates. When using the meat and produce sample, we also control for dummy variables indicating the position (meat wrapper, meat cutter, or produce clerk) for which the employee is being hired.
In our most basic specification of equation (1), we include only three additional controls variables (X jt ): a dummy variable equal to one if the manager is non-white, a dummy equal to one if there is no store manager present, and the total number of salaried managers present. The omitted manager ethnicity category is "white, non-Hispanic"; hence β compares the rates at which Hispanic managers and white, non-Hispanic managers hire Hispanic employees.
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The estimation results of this basic specification are shown in the first column of Table 5 . The estimated effect of having a Hispanic manager varies dramatically across jobs. For cashiers and stockers, the estimates are small and statistically insignificant. But for baggers and for meat and produce employees, we estimate large and statistically significant effects.
For baggers, the estimates imply a 52 percentage point difference in the rate that Hispanic and white managers hire Hispanics. In our sample, a typical white manager in a given store hires an average of six non-Hispanic baggers for every one Hispanic bagger. Thus our estimate means that replacing the white manager with a Hispanic manager would yield a dramatic change in this ratio-with one nonHispanic bagger being hired for every two Hispanics hired.
In the case of meat and produce employees, the column (1) estimate implies that Hispanic managers hire 26 percentage points more Hispanic employees. A typical white manager in the meat or produce department hires roughly one Hispanic for every eight hires. Hence our estimate means that a Hispanic manager in the same store would hire three Hispanics for every eight hires.
To test for differences among meat wrappers, meat cutters, and produce clerks, we also estimate a model that includes the interaction of Mgr_Hispanic with the job title indicators. While the results suggest that the effects of manager ethnicity are smaller for meat wrappers than they are for meat cutters and produce clerks, the differences are not statistically significant.
In column (1), the focal manager in the analysis of baggers and cashiers is the store manager (or assistant manager); and in the analysis of stockers, meat department employees and produce clerks, it is the relevant department manager. These estimates may understate the role of manager ethnicity in determining hiring patterns if other managers were involved in the hiring process. It is plausible, for example, that the assistant or relief manager would be involved in the hiring of baggers and cashiers even if a store manager is present. It is also plausible that the store-level managers would be involved (and perhaps ultimately responsible for) the hiring of employees in the stocking, meat, and produce departments.
In column (2), we address these possibilities by adding a variable measuring the fraction Hispanic among the store-level managers (store, assistant, and relief). This variable has a significant positive coefficient only in the case of meat and produce employees, suggesting that the ethnicity of the store-level managers is relevant in the meat and produce departments. However, the estimated effect of having a Hispanic department manager remains unchanged.
The fixed effect equations used in columns (1) and (2) control for permanent differences across stores and for time-series variation that is common to all stores. But they do not control for differences across stores that also vary over time. Hence if some determinants of hiring patterns varied both across stores and over time, the estimates resulting from equation (1) The coefficients from this specification are shown in column (3). We find a significant coefficient on the new control variables in only one case-the negative coefficient on the Hispanic share of non-stocking department managers in the analysis of new hires for the stocker position. This negative coefficient implies that when there are more Hispanic managers in the meat and produce departments, the stocking department is less likely to hire Hispanics. A possible explanation is that when there are job openings in more than one department and when the meat or produce manager is Hispanic, Hispanic applicants tend to be hired as meat or produce workers and consequently are less likely to be hired as stockers.
In no case is the probability of hiring a Hispanic significantly correlated with the Hispanic share of employees in the rest of the store. And in no case does controlling for store demographics reduce the coefficient on Mgr_Hispanic. Hence the results in column (3) generally support the conclusion that the estimates from columns (1) and (2) are not driven by changes in the labor pools of stores, but instead reflect systematic differences in the hiring patterns of Hispanic and non-Hispanic managers.
Our second version of equation (1) includes store-specific trends in addition to store fixed effects.
The estimates from this specification are shown in column (4), and can be interpreted as showing whether a change in the ethnicity of the manager leads to a deviation from the trend in the Hispanic share of the group being analyzed. However, our panel is relatively short and-except for baggers-we have a small number of observations per store. As a result, it is difficult to estimate store-specific trends with precision.
But in the analysis of baggers, we do have a reasonable degree of precision. Here the coefficient on Mgr_Hispanic remains very close to what it was in the first three specifications and also remains statistically significant. So here column (4) reinforces the conclusion drawn from the estimate in column (3). Within the same store and hiring from an ethnically similar labor pool, Hispanic managers hire more Hispanic baggers than do white managers.
When we include store-specific trends for the other positions, the coefficients on Mgr_Hispanic do change but the standard errors to become much larger. As a result, none of the coefficients on
Mgr_Hispanic is statistically different from zero. In the analysis of meat and produce employees, the positive coefficient drops from 26 (in the first three columns) to 18 and loses its statistical significance.
Given the lack of precision, it is hard to draw firm conclusions from this result. But because the estimated coefficient remains positive and large, it is nevertheless consistent with the conclusion that manager ethnicity affects hiring patterns in the meat and produce departments.
To examine the meat and produce departments further, we perform a third test which exploits both inter-department variation in manager ethnicity and variation over time. Using only meat and produce employees, we estimate an equation that includes store-year fixed effects (μ jt ):
With β constrained to be the same across the three job categories in the meat and produce departments, this model is identified off of store-years in which the meat manager is a different ethnicity from the produce manager. Because it controls for job title, this specification also exploits the fact that some storeyears have a white produce manager and a Hispanic meat manager, while in others the reverse is true.
Thus a positive value for β would indicate that the department with the Hispanic manager tends to hire more Hispanics than the department with the white manager.
The estimated coefficient is shown in column (5), and it is positive. While only marginally significant (p=.10), it is large in magnitude and suggests nearly a 60 percentage point difference between
Hispanic and white managers in the probability of hiring a Hispanic employee.
Why and when do hiring patterns depend on manager ethnicity?
We conclude from the analysis of new hires that when hiring into four of six job positions, Hispanic managers systematically hire more Hispanics and fewer whites than do white, non-Hispanic managers. But this conclusion raises two additional questions. First, why do white and Hispanic managers have different hiring patterns? And second, why are differences observed for some jobs and not for others? While these questions are difficult to answer, some light can be gained through additional analysis.
The differences in hiring patterns between Hispanic and non-Hispanic managers may be caused by one or a combination of several factors. As in Becker's (1971) model, segregated hiring could result from taste-based discrimination either by managers or by employees. Also, it could occur if segregated networks are used by managers searching for applicants and by employees searching for jobs. Finally, if manager-employee similarity improves productivity (e.g., because communication is facilitated by a shared language or culture), then managers may hire ethnically similar employees for efficiency reasons.
If production complementarities based on ethnic similarity are important, the company might intentionally segregate employees based on their ethnic similarity to managers. But if so, the firm should promote such matching both through the hiring process and through transfers between stores. Hence, one way to assess the likelihood that productivity considerations are important is to examine employees who enter a store by transferring from a similar job at another store. Table 6 shows the results of regression analysis identical to that which produced the results in Table 5 -except that the dependent variable is defined with respect to new transfers into the store instead of new hires. In no job position does manager ethnicity affect the probability that a new transfer is Hispanic. The estimates are all very close to zero and are estimated with at least as much precision as those from our hiring analysis. The lack of any relationship between manager ethnicity and the ethnic composition of new transfers suggests that the estimates from the analysis of new hires are not explained by efforts to raise productivity.
Further, it may be that employees can discriminate more when deciding whether to accept a job than when deciding whether to transfer. However, as we discuss below in section 4, the results of our separations analysis suggest that employee preferences for ethnically similar managers are unlikely to explain the hiring outcomes.
On the other hand, the contrast between the results for new hires and those for transfers is at least consistent with the use of ethnically segregated hiring networks, because such networks should not be important for transferring between stores. It is also consistent with taste-based discrimination by managers in the hiring process, because it is quite plausible that managers have less control over who is transferred into their department than they do over new hires, or that the tastes of managers may be outweighed by strong recommendations from another store in their own firm.
We turn next to the question of why we find differential hiring patterns in some jobs (baggers, meat wrappers, meat cutters, and produce clerks) but not in others (cashiers and stockers). As we have seen in Table 2 , there are several differences in employee characteristics across the six jobs we analyzeincluding differences in gender composition and in average wage, age, and tenure. But in none of these variables is there a commonality between baggers on the one hand and meat and produce employees on the other. However, returning to Table 1 , we can see that one thing these positions do have in common is a relatively small number of employees per store. The average store has 3.2 baggers, 1.1 meat wrappers, 2.1 meat cutters, and 1.6 produce clerks. By contrast, the typical store has 8.0 cashiers and 6.4 stockers.
This comparison suggests that manager ethnicity matters more in departments with fewer employees.
To test this hypothesis more formally, we pool newly hired employees in all jobs and estimate versions of equation (1) that include the interaction of Mgr_Hispanic with one of several variables measuring the number of coworkers in the employee's job or department. 14 We find significant differences between large and small departments. Specifically, our estimates suggest that manager ethnicity affects the probability of hiring a Hispanic employee only in very small departments where the newly hired employee has either one coworker or no coworkers.
While we cannot determine why department size matters, we can suggest three plausible reasons.
First, if a department has only one or two employees, then it is difficult to prove that a given ethnic distribution of employment resulted from systematic bias rather than from chance. Indeed, in the case where a manager must choose only one employee from a diverse applicant pool, it is impossible to hire a "representative" workforce. Hence managers in these cases may feel less constrained by the need to appear unbiased. Second, interpersonal compatibility may be correlated with ethnic similarity, and it may be more important in small departments because the fewer employees there are, the more interaction the manager tends to have with each individual. Finally, a manager's preference for having similar employees may be highly nonlinear. For example, suppose that managers have strong preferences for having at least one employee of the same ethnicity, but weak preferences regarding the overall ethnic distribution of employees. In this case, managerial preferences would tend to affect the ethnic composition of employees only when the numbers are very small.
Manager-Employee Ethnic Differences and Employee Separation Rates
We examine the effect of manager-employee ethnic differences on employee separation rates by estimating a linear probability model where the dependent variable is equal to one if an individual observed in one year separated from the firm within the following year. We again exploit within-store variation in manager ethnicity to control for unobserved differences across workplaces, because it is again important to distinguish the effects of differences in manager ethnicity from unobserved workplace differences. For example, suppose that neighborhoods are segregated and that Hispanic managers tend to work at stores in Hispanic neighborhoods while white managers work in white neighborhoods. Hispanic employees who work at the stores with white managers might then have lower job attachment simply variables indicating each of the job titles. Also, because larger stores are located in cities with more Hispanic, we also control for the interaction of Mgr_Hispanic with the average Hispanic share of all employees in the store.
because they have longer commutes.
Equation (3) shows the general form of the estimation equations. The parameter of interest is the coefficient β on a dummy variable (Mgr_Different_Ethnicity) that equals one if the employee's manager at time t is of a different ethnicity from the employee.
A positive value for β would indicate that employees whose manager is a different ethnicity are more likely to separate from the firm within the following year. We control for a vector of employee characteristics (X jt ) that includes ethnicity and gender indicators, employee age and its square, and tenure and its square; and for dummy variables indicating the ethnicity of the employee's manager at time t (M jt ).
We also control for other time-varying characteristics of the store's workforce (W jt ), a set of year indicators (T t ), and store fixed effects (μ j ). Because we typically have more than one observation per individual employee, we adjust the standard errors to account for clustering at the level of the employee.
We estimate several variations of equation (3), and we run separate regressions for each of four groups: baggers, cashiers, stockers, and meat and produce employees. The results are shown in Table 7 .
Column (1) controls only for characteristics of the employee and his or her manager, plus the store and year fixed effects. We obtain a positive and statistically significant estimate of β for only one groupcashiers. The estimate suggests that cashiers are 4.5 percentage points (roughly 40 percent) more likely to separate from the firm when they have an ethnically dissimilar manager. For baggers, our estimate is positive but statistically insignificant, and for stockers, and for meat and produce employees, the estimates are very close to zero. The estimates are similarly very close to zero when we estimate separate regressions for meat wrappers, meat cutters, and produce clerks, and there are no significant differences in the effect of manager-employee ethnic differences among these three job titles.
Column (2) examines whether separations are related to the fraction of all salaried managers that share the employee's ethnicity. This could be the case, for example, if the presence of same-ethnicity role models or mentors were an important determinant of job attachment. However, we find no evidence that this variable is related to separation rates.
If employees prefer working with similar others, then separation rates could also be affected by changes in the fraction of coworkers that share the employee's ethnicity. We examine this hypothesis in Column (3), which adds a variable measuring the fraction of coworkers' who are a different ethnicity from the employee. This variable is set equal to zero for employees with no coworkers, and we include a dummy variable for employees with no coworkers. We also control for the number of coworkers and for the fraction of coworkers in each ethnic group. The results suggest that having more ethnically dissimilar coworkers does increase separation rates for baggers. A 50 percentage point increase in the share of coworkers who are a different ethnicity (e.g., an increase from one out of two to two out of two coworkers) corresponds to roughly a seven percentage point (or 15 percent) increase in the probability of separation. We do not find significant effects of coworkers dissimilarity for employees in other job titles.
Columns (4) and (5) show the results from specifications that control for changes in the ethnic composition of each store's labor pool over time. Column (4) controls for the fraction of managers and employees in other departments who are a different ethnicity from the employee, and for the fraction of those other managers and employees who are Hispanic. Column (5) drops these variables but adds storespecific trends to the model. The estimated effect of having a dissimilar manager on cashier separation rates is robust to these last two model specifications, though the estimates become somewhat less precise.
The effect of coworker dissimilarity on bagger separation rates is also robust. And finally, the estimated effects of manager-employee dissimilarity for stockers and for meat and produce employees remain very close to zero.
The analysis of separations can help us assess whether employee discrimination plays a role in the overall ethnic segregation of the workforce. Likewise, this analysis can shed some light on whether employee discrimination explains the differential hiring patterns. If employees discriminate when deciding whether to keep a job, then one might expect them also to discriminate when deciding whether to accept a job. Of course, decisions regarding separations are not always made by the employees, and unfortunately we cannot distinguish quits from dismissals. Nevertheless, overall separation rates should be closely tied to quit rates.
If we assume that employee discrimination should manifest itself in higher separation rates among employees with ethnically dissimilar managers, then our results might suggest that with the possible exception of cashiers, employee discrimination is not an important source of ethnic segregation at this firm. However, even if employees were discriminating, there are three reasons why manageremployee ethnic differences might not lead to higher separation rates.
First, employee discrimination could affect hiring outcomes but not separation rates if employees who would quit rather than work for an ethnically different manager never have to make this decision; instead, they simply don't take jobs with dissimilar managers in the first place. In our sample, however, many employees sample receive new managers at some point during their employment with the firm;
hence selection at the hiring stage does not guarantee that employees with discriminatory preferences will never have an ethnically dissimilar manager. Moreover, we re-estimate our model after restricting the sample to employees who receive new managers (i.e. different from the ones they chose to work for), and our estimated effects of manager-employee dissimilarity remain very close to zero.
Second, employee discrimination might not affect separation rates if employees who want to stop working with their current manager have the option of transferring instead of quitting. Table 8 shows the results of regression analysis identical to that which produced Table 7-except that the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the employee transferred to another store within the next year. While the results suggest employee discrimination may have a small effect on transfers among stockers, the estimates are not statistically significant. And for the rest of the jobs, the estimates are close to zero. Again, we also re-estimate these models using only the subsample of employees who received a new manager, and we find no significant effects of ethnic differences between manager and employee.
Finally, because our data only has information on employees who were present on December 31 st of each year, it is possible sample selection bias has affected on our estimates. If employees who dislike working for dissimilar managers tend to quit after only a few months, then many of those employees will be missing from our data. In this case, estimates based on the employees we do observe will understate the effect that ethnic dissimilarity has on separation rates. 15 We can assess the impact of such selection bias by asking whether the estimated effects of ethnic dissimilarity on separations are larger among employees who have been hired very recently (e.g. within three, six or nine months). We find no significant differences by employee tenure, and therefore conclude that sample selection bias is not important for our results.
In sum, the weight of the evidence here suggests that for all jobs except cashiers, employee discrimination probably is not an important source of segregation at our workplace. The evidence suggests it does not affect separation rates. What's more, our evidence also suggests that employee discrimination cannot explain why, in the smaller departments, white and Hispanic managers differ in the rates at which they hire Hispanic employees.
Finally, we should ask why we do find some evidence that ethnic differences lead to higher separation rates for cashiers, but not other jobs. Here, it is again interesting to consider what separates cashiers from the other jobs. Returning to Tables 2 and 3 , we see that while all management positions and all other non-entry level positions were occupied predominantly by men, the cashier position is occupied almost entirely by women. Further, the probability of promotion for these women was very close to zero during our sample period, and a class action lawsuit brought by several female employees against the firm in the early 1980s suggests that the employees were both aware of and resentful of this statistic. Cashiers were thus predominantly female employees with male managers who had very low expectations of ever advancing within the firm. 16 Perhaps under these strained working conditions, sensitivity to ethnic differences was more of a catalyst.
Conclusion
Although it is well documented that U.S. workplaces are highly segregated by employee 15 Such sample selection bias could also cause the estimates from our analysis of new hires to overstate the effects of manager ethnicity, because new hires whose ethnicity differed from the managers, having quit more quickly, would be underrepresented in our data. This is unlikely to be an issue for meat and produce employees, whose average tenure ranges from 6.5 to 9 years, but is a potential issue for baggers. 16 Meat wrappers were also predominantly female and had very low promotion rates; however, meat wrappers meat wrappers earn 15 percent higher wages than cashiers.
ethnicity, much less is known about the sources of this segregation. Using nine years of personnel records from a regional grocery chain, this study examines both the effect of manager ethnicity on hiring patterns and the effect of manager-employee ethnic differences on employee separations.
Our results suggest that in our setting manager ethnicity affects the ethnic composition of employees mainly through the hiring process. We find that Hispanic managers are significantly more likely than white, non-Hispanic managers to hire Hispanic employees. Interestingly, however, this effect is limited to departments or positions in which there are only one or two employees; in larger departments, we find no significant differences between Hispanic and non-Hispanic managers.
Further, we find no significant differences by manager ethnicity when examining new employees who transfer in from other stores. And we find that manager-employee ethnic differences affect rates of employee separations in only one case: cashiers. This was not one of the positions where hiring biases are found, and further consideration suggests this was perhaps a special case exacerbated by strained working conditions that indeed prompted a lawsuit for gender bias.
Why does manager ethnicity affect hiring patterns? The fact that manager ethnicity does not affect the ethnicity of employees who transfer from other stores suggests that the observed differences in hiring patterns are not driven by a deliberate human resource policy that matches employees with ethnically similar managers-e.g., to improve productivity. Our analysis also suggests that employee discrimination is probably not a factor. Ethnic differences do not affect separation rates, and they have no effect on the rate at which employees transfer out of their current stores and into others-even after they receive a new manager of a different ethnicity.
The evidence thus suggests that the differential hiring patterns between Hispanic and nonHispanic managers do not likely result from production complementarities or employee discrimination.
Hence the more probable explanation for these differential patterns is some form of bias in the hiring process. The most likely sources of hiring bias are taste-based discrimination by managers and the use of ethnically segregated hiring networks to recruit new employees.
It is difficult to know how well our specific results may generalize to other firms and other sectors. Our findings suggest that even within a firm, the role of manager ethnicity may vary across departments. In particular, they imply that the size of the department may influence the extent of biases in hiring. Our findings thus suggest a need for more research on hiring biases at small firms and in small departments within firms. Table 2 Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses (suppressed for dummy variables). Employment-weighted averages across store-years. a "Manager" refers to the highest-ranking salaried manager present (e.g. store manager or assistant manager) for baggers and cashiers, the night crew chief for stockers, the meat manager for meat cutters and meat wrappers, and the produce manager for produce clerk.
FIGURE 1. STORE-LEVEL ORGANIZATION
b "Salaried managers" refers to the store, assistant, and relief managers at the store where the individual is employed.
c "Coworkers" refers to all employees with the same job title in the same store and year, excluding the individual. For meat wrappers and meat cutters, coworkers include all nonmanagerial meat department employees. Means based on employees who have at least one coworker. [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] . Robust standard errors in parenthesis, adjusted for clustering on store. ** significant at 1%, * significant at 5%, ‡ significant at 10%. Additional controls include: a dummy variable for non-white managers (the omitted category is white non-Hispanic); a dummy for missing store managers; the number of salaried managers present; and dummy variables for eight out of nine years. Columns (2) controls for the fraction of salaried managers who are non-white. The regressions based on meat and produce employees include dummy variables indicating the job title (meat wrapper, meat cutter or produce clerk). Notes for Table 7 : Estimates from linear probability models in which dependent variable =1 if the employment with the company was terminated within the year. Estimation sample includes all employees present on Dec. 31 st for each year from 1976-1984, excluding employees in stores than closed the following year. Additional controls include: a dummy variable equal to one if the employee is non-white (the omitted employee ethnicity category is white non-Hispanic); a dummy variable indicating employee gender; employee age and its square; employee tenure and its square; a dummy variable equal to one if the manager is non-white (the omitted manager ethnicity category is white non-Hispanic); the number of salaried managers present; a dummy equal to one if the highest-ranking manager is the assistant mgr.; a dummy equal to one if the highestranking manager is relief manager; dummy variables for eight our of nine years. Column (3) control for the fraction of salaried managers who are Hispanic and the fraction non-white. Columns (4), (5), and (6) control for the fraction of coworkers who are Hispanic and the fraction non-white; the number of coworkers; and a dummy variable equal to one if the employee has no coworkers. (If the employee has no coworkers, then the fraction of each ethnicity and the fraction whose ethnicity differs are all set equal to zero.) Column (5) also controls for the fraction Hispanic and the fraction non-white of other department managers and of other employees. The regressions based on meat and produce employees also include dummy variables indicating the employee's current job title (meat wrapper, meat cutter, or produce clerk). Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are adjusted for clustering on employee. ** significant at 1%, * significant at 5%, ‡ significant at 10%. 
